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In the US and Europe, the far right is often portrayed as the defender of the working class, the representative of “forgotten” people or the post-industrial “left-behinds”. The working classes, so the argument goes, have flocked to the far right because “the left” has betrayed them. Moreover, far-right parties, it is claimed, have moved to the left on socioeconomic issues such as employment rights, replacing social democratic parties as the “new working-class parties”.
Despite the popularity of this narrative, including among social democratic elites in Europe, workers have not flocked to far-right parties, but rather to the mainstream right and the Greens. And now, our new study shows that while far-right parties might talk leftwing, they still back rightwing anti-worker policies.
We analysed the voting patterns of far-right groups on a range of socioeconomic issues. We specifically looked at the two far-right groups in the outgoing European parliament (2019-2024): the now disbanded Identity and Democracy (ID) group including Marine Le Pen’s National Rally, and the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), which is dominated by the Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni’s party, Brothers of Italy. We also looked at Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party in Hungary, which is at the helm of the new Patriots for Europe (PfE), formed as the unofficial successor to ID after the European elections this summer.
Our analysis looked at the votes of all far-right parties on eight issues related to workers’ rights, including paying workers an adequate minimum wage, ensuring transparency over pay, providing quality traineeships and setting a global minimum tax for multinational companies.
The analysis, for the European Trade Union Institute, shows that, contrary to what the far right has us believe – and what is increasingly received wisdom – its voting patterns on proposed EU directives do not indicate a pro-worker stance on socioeconomic issues, let alone a leftwing one. Quite the contrary: on virtually all eight issues we examined, the far – right’s voting behaviour suggests a stance that is indifferent, if not outright hostile, to workers’ rights. One striking example is the clear rejection of pay transparency and an opposition to an EU directive on adequate minimum wages, mainly among members of the ID group.
Importantly, we also find substantial differences in voting patterns across the far-right parties, in stark contrast to the voting behaviour of other political groups in the European parliament. While most political groups vote almost unanimously on socioeconomic issues, the two far-right groups (particularly the ECR) are often quite divided.
For example, on proposals for an EU-wide minimum rate of corporation tax, which 92% of MEPs supported, those in ID and ECR were largely divided on the issue. While three ID parties voted against the directive, including Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), three voted in favour and two abstained. In the ECR, half of its 10 far-right parties voted against, four abstained and only one voted in favour. The poor voting discipline within the groups indicates that socioeconomic matters are not a core issue for the far right. Interestingly, the overall voting behaviour of Fidesz in Hungary fitted neither group, and was overall slightly less unfavourable to the idea of setting a minimum tax for global companies across the EU than other far-right parties.
Interestingly, southern European far-right parties, such as the Italian Lega (ID), Meloni’s Brothers of Italy and the Greek Solution (ECR), voted most positively on workers’ rights. The Sweden Democrats, Estonian Conservative People’s party and the Danish People’s party voted most negatively – no doubt a pushback against strong workers’ rights that already exist in their countries.
Even though our research shows that the ECR emphasises socioeconomic issues more than ID members, the amount of difference in far-right parties’ voting patterns, as well as their poor voting discipline, confirms that workers’ rights remain secondary. This is in sharp contrast to asylum and migration, which is still the core issue of the far right, where we found unanimous support for fortress Europe across both groups.
In short, although the far right may purport to stand up for workers’ rights by talking in increasingly leftwing ways, they still mostly vote to undermine those rights. Our research not only shows that the portrayal of the far right as pro-worker is generalising at best, and factually wrong at worst; it is also a reminder that we should not just look at what the far right says, but also more importantly at what it does. And on close inspection there is little doubt: the far right is anti-worker, making it rightwing not only on asylum and migration, but also when it comes to socioeconomic issues, too.